The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: The Effect of Deleveraging on the Real Economy by ., Laura Bottazzi & ., Anastasia Girshina
 
 
Abstract—This paper seeks to explain the mechanism of 
transmission of failures from the financial sector to the real 
economy. We consider the tightening of firms' financial 
conditions as an engine of such a transmission. In order to 
investigate this mechanism we construct a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model focusing on the production side of the 
economy as a channel of the transition of the crisis. The debt 
cutting is modeled as a negative shock to the lending mechanism 
through an increase in the level of collateral required by financial 
institutions in order to provide a loan. We conclude that 
deleveraging might be one of the main reasons for the drop in 
both consumption and investment during the recent financial 
crisis. 
 




HE Great Depression followed the worst financial crisis 
in the history of the United States and of many other 
countries. The Great Recession followed the second-worst 
stock market crash in 2008. There have been many discussions 
among economists on the reasons that led to such severe 
collapses. As a consequence, a vast range of models seeking to 
explain the mechanism of transmission of failures from the 
financial sector to the real economy has been developed. 
First of all, economists stressed the regularities and the 
common features in the behavior of the main economic 
indicators during the different types of economic crises 
occurred in the last century. As it is shown in Hall [1], similar 
patterns in the behavior of the unemployment rate during crisis 
can be observed. Defining slumps as periods when the 
employed fraction of the labor force aged 25 through 54 is less 
than 95.5 percent Hall observes that the most serious collapses 
in the US economic history had followed financial crises.  
In the case of the slump that began at the end of 2007 and 
became severer after the crisis of September 2008, the 
mechanism of the development of the crisis is rather clear: 
years of stable and rising home prices made levered positions 
in real-estate-related assets appear quite safe. Regulators 
permitted the increase in leverage, especially to investment 
banks and other financial entities, to be free from government 
guarantees. Credit became available to households, which 
were denied access under previous standards. The result was 
an increase in homebuilding and sales for consumer durables, 
 
 
along with the buildup of consumer debt. A totally unexpected 
decline in home prices conveyed the financial crisis and it led 
to the thin capitalization of financial intermediaries which 
responded with the tightening of lending standards and with 
the increase of the interest rate charged to borrowers. The 
result has been a long and deep slump. Unemployment has 
been a leading symptom of the poor performance of the 
economy. It lingered at a level around 10 percent three years 
after the beginning of the crisis. 
Another clear indicator of the state of the economy has been 
the drop in the level of output. It is interesting, though, to look 
at the four components of the real GDP, as shown in Fig. 1: 
they didn't have the same dynamics after the second quarter of 
2008. Indeed, net export and government purchases were 
barely affected by the crisis. The biggest drop, instead, was 
experienced by the consumption of nondurables and services 
and, more importantly, by the fourth component: investment, 
defined as the sum of consumer durables, business and 
residential investment. 
It is a standard practice to finance investments through the 
financial market. Indeed, business heavily relies on it when 
financing investments in plants, equipment and inventories. 
Residential investment almost totally depends on the financial 
market, since both homebuilders and homebuyers finance the 
construction and the purchase of the houses with bank loans. 
The same happens to car purchases as almost all the car-
buyers take out loans to buy a new car. Therefore, precisely 
this component of real GDP- investment -is the one strongly 
linked to the financial market. 
Given that investment highly depends on the borrowing 
from the financial market - both through bank loans and on the 
bond markets - we find it interesting to think about some 
unexpected shocks to the lending mechanism as a possible 
source of the drop in investments.  
Furthermore, as it is shown by Jermann and Quadrini in [2], 
not only the sharp economic downturn of 2008-09 was caused 
by a tightening of the firms' financing conditions, but also 
those occurred in the period 1990-91 and in 2001 were 
strongly influenced by changes in the credit conditions. Using 
the financial data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
Federal Reserve, Jermann and Quadrini [2] show that equity 
payouts are negatively correlated with debt repurchases and 
that debt repurchases increase during or around recessions. 
Consequently recessions lead firms to restructure their 
financial positions by cutting debt and reducing the payments 
made to shareholders. 
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Fig. 1.  Changes from the Second Quarter of 2008 in Four Components of 
Real GDP 
Source: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.6. 
Although most of the literature addresses the problem of the 
deleveraging of the household's sector and the effect on 
household consumption, we find it interesting to investigate 
the effect of the failures of the financial sector looking at the 
firm’s deleveraging. 
In order to do this, we construct a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model with two sectors: households and 
firms. In the paper we consider a simple model with identical 
consumers1 and a firm capital investment decision financed by 
a loan. The shock to the lending mechanism is modeled as a 
change in the level of collateral required by financial 
institutions in order to provide the loan. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we give a short 
overview of the recent literature on this topic. Then, we look 
at how investment models have made capital endogenous and 
have modeled credit constraint. Finally, we construct our own 
DSGE model with endogenous capital and a credit constraint 
and we calibrate a version of it with identical consumers. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature that considers deleveraging as the main 
channel through which shocks on the financial markets affect 
the real economy take two main perspectives :  
 Deleveraging from the side of households. In this case 
demand shocks lead to the impossibility of smoothing 
consumption. The major effect observed is on the 
consumption of durables. 
 Deleveraging from the side of firms. In this case the main 
real effect is the drop in investments. 
Interestingly, both effects can be observed in Fig. 1. 
There are several major papers addressing the deleveraging 
channel of the real effects of financial crisis.  
Hall [1], [4] concentrates his analysis on such drivers of the 
crisis as financial frictions and agency costs. Three are the 
main forces that drove the economy in the real crisis:  
1. the buildup of excess stocks of housing and consumer 
durables;  
 
1 Eggertsson and Krugman [3] consider two types of consumers: borrowers 
and savers. The model here developed could be extended to the case of 
heterogeneous consumers. 
2. the expansion of consumer debt that financed the 
buildup;  
3. the financial frictions that resulted from the decline in 
real-estate prices.  
His findings are in line with those of Bernanke and Gilchrist 
[5]. A large decrease in the values of the asset holdings of 
financial institutions led to a worsening of agency problems 
and to a widening in the credit spreads. The diminished ability 
to finance the purchase of capital goods resulted in a drop in 
all types of investment - plants, equipment, inventories, 
residential constructions, and consumer durables. The 
situation was worsened, as shown in Hall [4], by the increase 
of BAA corporate bond rate that exacerbated the collapse of 
investment.   
 Philippon and Midrigan [6] provide evidence that in U.S. 
output and employment had declined more in regions where 
household leverage had increased more during the credit 
boom. They conclude, that a decline in home equity borrowing 
tightens the cash-in-advance constraint, thus triggering a 
recession. 
 From another perspective Eggertsson [7] analyzes a new-
Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model where he can develop, the so-called, paradox of thrift. 
This paradox is a situation in which an increase in interest 
rates drives savings up and slowdown economy. The paper 
investigates the problem of the lack of demand and therefore 
tries to explore possible spending stimulating policies. 
Particularly, he concentrates on taxes reduction (payroll tax, 
capital tax, sales tax). The results obtained in this paper are 
due to the hypothesis of zero-bounded interest rates: cutting 
taxes instead of being expansionary ends up being 
contractionary. At the aggregate level cutting the payroll tax 
leads to the decrease of employment in equilibrium (paradox 
of toil) and cutting capital taxes leads to the decrease of 
savings in equilibrium - paradox of thrift in the model with 
capital. Eggertsson [8], instead, considers a DSGE model with 
labor and, therefore, can only concentrate on the paradox of 
toil. There is no capital in the model he develops. 
 Another paper exploring the paradox of thrift is Christiano 
[9]. He elaborates on the model of Eggertsson and Woodford 
[10] and [11], predicting a downward spiral in investments in 
case of zero-bound environment. A shift to the right of the 
supply of savings, i.e. its increase, is modeled as a shock to the 
discount rate. In Eggertsson and Woodford [11] and 
Eggertsson and Woodford [10] with no capital (to which 
Christiano in [9] refers as to an inelastic investment case) the 
shock to the discount rate leads to the drop in the level of 
consumption in the effort to increase saving. But since 
investments (and therefore, savings) cannot change in 
equilibrium, by construction, and real interest rate is zero-
bounded, a shock leads to the drop in output and employment. 
If investment is introduced (the investment-elastic case in the 
paper), the consequent reduction of interest rate is enough to 
offset the rise in investments and no downward spiral follows. 
Yet another paper addressing the question of deleveraging 
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is Eggertsson and Krugman [3]. They investigate three 
paradoxes emerging in the environment of zero-bounded 
interest rates. The first two were already described above. 
They are the "paradox of thrift" and the "paradox of toil". 
Under the last one more willingness to work ends up reducing 
the amount of work being done. The third is the "paradox of 
flexibility": when the economy is under a large deleveraging 
shock, flexible prices make matters worse. Indeed, falling 
prices do not help to raise demand. Instead, they only raise the 
real value of debt and depress spending by debtors (Fisher 
effect [12]). In this situation for a slump to be avoided, 
someone must spend to compensate for the fact that debtors 
are spending less. A zero-nominal interest rate may not be low 
enough to induce the needed spending. Even though the shock 
lands the economy in a paradox of topsy-turvy, in which 
saving is vice, increased productivity can reduce output, and 
flexible wages increase unemployment, expansionary fiscal 
policy should be effective. The rise in government spending 
not only won't depress private spending, but it will also lead to 
an increased spending on the part of the consumers. 
As regards the literature that considers the existence of 
credit constraints and their effects on firms’ investment 
decisions some contributions need to be cited. Some of them 
are discussed in Bernanke and Gilchrist [5], Curdia and 
Woodford [13], Aiyagari [14], Kiyotaki and Moore [15], 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov [16], Gertler and Kiyotaki [17], 
Khan and Thomas [18], Buera and Moll [19], Del Negro and 
Kiyotaki [20], Cagetti and Bassetto [21], Goldberg [22]. 
Nevertheless, the papers that greatly influenced our 
modeling strategy are the following three. 
Aghion and Banerjee [23], consider credit constrained firms 
operating in open economy and credit constraints are modeled 
in the framework of entry barriers. It is assumed that 
entrepreneurs are subject to borrowing constraint and that the 
maximum amount they can borrow is: 
dt ≤ μtωt                  (1) 
where ωt is firms’ cash flow (or their wealth) and μt is a 
credit multiplier which could be either constant throughout the 
model or can depend on the real and/or on the nominal interest 
rate. 
 In Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [24] firms borrowing 
constraints are modelled as: 
b
i,t+1 ≤ −φkkt+1                (2) 
Firms have to provide collateral, and φk is the fraction of 
capital required as a collateral. When prices decrease banks 
increase this fraction, which reduces firms ability to borrow. 
Reduction in the firms borrowing, in its turn, reduces 
investments, which reduces capital and, again, decreases 
borrowing. This process generates a spiral. 
Using a different approach Jermann and Quadrini [2] 
consider firms that finance investments by issuing equity 
and/or debt. Debt is subject to an enforcement constraint, 
which depends on firm’s lifetime profitability. Since firms can 
default, this enforcement constraint is exactly the source of 
financial frictions.  
We now turn to our model. 
III. THE BENCHMARK MODEL WITH IDENTICAL CONSUMERS 
In this section we consider a simple model with identical 
consumers and we investigate the effect of deleveraging on the 
production side of the economy2. To study the behavior under 
the “paradox of thrift” 3 we introduce investments in the 
Eggertsson and Krugman [3] model.  
The representative consumer maximizes his utility function: 
max E0   
               
 
    )       (3) 
subject to the resource constraint 
Bt = (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + PtWtht − PtCt  + Tt     (4) 
We assume there exists a continuum of goods represented by 
the interval [0,1].    is the consumption index given by 
           
                   
 
 
where       is the quantity of 
good j consumed by the household in period t.     is the 
corresponding aggregate price index 
            
               
 
 
 with       being the price of 
good j. 
Household decides how to allocate its consumption 
expenditures among different goods. It, hence, maximizes the 
consumption index    for any given level of expenditures 
              
   
 
 
. The solution to this maximization problem 
yields demand equations of good j        




   for all 
j. 
In the budget constraint    is the real wage rate and     
denotes hours the household works.       are total 
consumption expenditures.    represents purchases of one-
period bonds with nominal interest rate   , and    is the lump-
sum component of income. 
The sequence of period budget constraint satisfies the 
solvency condition                  for all t. 
 To construct firms’ problem we assume there is a 
continuum of firms and each firm produces a differentiated 
good          All firms face identical technology represented 
by a Cobb-Douglas production function (7). The demand for 
good j (6) is identical for every firm and is derived from the 
households’ maximization problem.  Further, we assume that 
only fraction     of firms can change their prices freely in 
any period.  
What is important for our model is that we assume that 
firms can invest (It) and therefore, we include capital stock 
(Kt) in the model. Thus, firms problem is to maximize profits 
subject to capital accumulation constraint (8): 
 
2 Given the presence of the capital in the model there are several ways to 
show the paradox of thrift. For example, we can do it by increasing the return 
on investments, or, following Eggertsson [7] by decreasing the tax rate on 
dividends. 
 
3 There are several ways to model endogeneous capital and investments. 
Among the papers that explore the models with endogenous capital are 
Eggertsson [7], Christiano [9], Koo [25], Kiyotaki and Moore [15], Krugman 
[26] and [27], McKinsey [28], Aghion and Scarpetta [29]. 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.3 No.3, June 2014
























1−γ               
(7) 
k
t+1 =(1−δ)kt +It               (8) 
We assume that firms can invest only by borrowing.  
I
t ≤ dt                   (9) 
To borrow firms have to provide collateral which is an 
exogenous fraction of its capital. This fraction is the source of 






t                   
(10) 
We assume that the shock to the level of collateral ξ follows 
AR(1) process: 
ξ t+1= φξ ξt + ς t+1               (11) 
where ς t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and standard 
deviation σ. 
Government expenditures are Gt and are aggregated 
according to a Dixit- Stigliz aggregator [30]. Government 
finances expenditures by collecting taxes Tt. Monetary policy 








)              (12) 
where φ
π > 1 and rt
n 
is the natural rate of interest. 
IV. SOLUTION AND CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL 
To analyze the effect of the increase of the collateral 
required by banks to supply a loan to firms on the level of 
investments we use numerical simulations.  
In order to perform such simulation of the model we choose 
preferences characterized by isoelastic utility function 
separable in consumption and leisure. 
       
    
   
  
        
   
          (13) 
Given this specification of the utility function and assuming 
that in steady state prices are stable we log-linearize the first 
order conditions of the optimization problem around the 
steady state to obtain a system of equations. We solve the 
system and compute impulse-response functions using the 
MATLAB routine Gensys written by Christopher Sims. 
To perform calibration we have used the following data 
sources: 
1. Flow of Funds Accounts on consumer debt (Federal 
Reserve board) 
2. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
3. Survey on Consumer Finances (SCF) 
4. Federal Reserve board for business loans 
5. Survey of Professional forecasters (Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve Bank) 
Using this data we can calibrate our model and analyze the 
impulse-response functions using benchmark parameters from 
Table 1. Following Hall [4], the economy has a single 
production sector with two inputs: labor and capital. It uses a 
Cobb-Douglas function, with a labor elasticity of 0.646. The 
utility function is calibrated in such a way that intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is 0.5. Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
is set to 1.9. The rate of depreciation of capital is set to 0.0188 
which corresponds to 7.5% of annual rate of depreciation of 
capital and fits NIPA Fixed Asset Tables. The parameter on 
leisure in the utility is chosen so that average hours worked for 
employed worker are 40% of their time endowment. The 
model has no economic growth, no uncertainty, and it is a 
closed economy. Steady-state value of output is normalized to 
1. Table 1. reports calibrated values of core parameters.  
TABLE I.  BENCHMARK CALIBRATION OF THE PARAMETERS 
Notation Description Value Source/Target 
 Preferences and technology   
  Share of labor in the production 
function 
0.646 NIPA Income Share 
   Intertemporal discount factor 0.9825 Jermann, Quadrini [2] 
  Intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution 
0.5 Hall [4] 
  Frisch Elasticity of labor 
supply 
1.9 Hall [4] 
  Coefficient on leisure in utility 12.48 Guerrieri, Lorenzoni [24] 
  Elasticity of substitution 
between varieties of goods 
6 Schmitt-Grohé, Uribe [31] 
  Capital depreciation rate 0.0188 NIPA Fixed Asset Tables 
 Fiscal and monetary policy   
   Monetary policy response to 
inflation 
1.5   Falagiarda, Marzo [32] 
  Percentage of firms not 
changing their price 
0.36 Woodford [33] 
i Net nominal interest rate 0.0163 Guerrieri, Lorenzoni [24] 
    
 
By calibrating the model according to these parameters, we 
obtain the impulse – response functions shown in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 exhibits a clear drop in capital, employment and 
output. The calibration results fit nicely with the graph of Fig. 
1. And, not surprisingly, we see the drop in consumption. 
 
Fig. 2.  Shock to the level of collateral 
Our findings also go in line with a variety of empirical 
papers. Among these papers is Mian and Sufi [34]. They 
estimated that a negative aggregate demand shock driven by 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.3 No.3, June 2014
20 © 2014 GSTF
 
household deleveraging is responsible for a large fraction of 
the decline in U.S. employment from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, 
they conclude that a high level of household debt and the 
associated deleveraging process are the main reasons for 
historically high unemployment in the U.S. economy. They 
also find that employment losses in the non-tradable sector are 
higher in high leverage U.S. counties, while losses in the 
tradable sector are uniformly distributed across all counties. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Household debt in the United States reached unprecedented 
levels before the onset of the recession. Economic literature 
strongly supports the view that the onset of the recession was 
driven by a series of shocks that required deleveraging of both 
households and firms.  
As we have stated at the beginning of this paper, the main 
objective was to investigate the mechanism of the transition of 
the crisis from the financial sector to the real economy. After 
performing an accurate empirical analysis we conclude that 
firms’ deleveraging process might have been one of the main 
reasons for the drop in both consumption and investments. In 
this paper we concentrate our attention on the drop in 
investments and on the deleveraging experienced by firms.  
To perform the analyses, we have modeled an economy 
with household and firms, where firms are credit constrained. 
Indeed, by solving this model with the MATLAB routine 
Gensys we were able to observe both the drop in the level of 
investment and, as a consequence, the drop in the output that 
is documented in Fig. 1.  
By including the capital in the model we were able to 
observe how the increase in the level of the collateral required 
by banks has led to the drop in investments, and, therefore, to 
the sharp reduction in the level of output.  
There are several policy implications which can be drawn 
from the model. Firstly, an increase in spending is required to 
avoid a slump. Secondly, an expansionary fiscal policy should 
be effective: an increase in government spending would lead 
to the increased spending on the part of liquidity-constrained 
debtors. The process of recovery will depend on debtors 
paying down their liabilities. And, as it is pointed out in 
Eggertsson and Krugman [3], this process corresponds very 
closely to Koo’s notion of a protracted ”balance sheet 
recession”.  
This work provides a possibility for future research. As we 
have solved and calibrated only the model with identical 
consumers, there is room for solving the extended model with 
heterogeneous consumers: savers and borrowers.  
Moreover, as it is shown in Hall [1], not only the drop in 
prices along with drop in the production of consumer durable, 
home-building, business structures can be observed, but also 
there were negative changes in both goods imported and 
exported. To study this effect could be a very interesting 
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